A fateful Governance Rectangle

A baseline study on the Causes of Conflicts
in the Central African Republic and the Republic of South Sudan,
in due consideration of the Republics of Sudan and Chad

by

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Preamble

This desktop study makes part of my mandate as political advisor to the Executive Secretary of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, Professor Ntumba-Luaba. It complies i) with his general request to produce regular political analyses on the complex conflict constellations in the Great Lakes Region. With the general breakdown of the rule of law in the Central African Republic and the sudden retirement of the transitional president Michel Djotodia, the Executive Secretary requested towards the end of last year an overview of the regional initiatives and a sketch of actions, the ICGLR could start. By and by, it became pretty clear that such a request requires more and sound research in order to map the various stakeholders, their ways, they are interlinked with each other and the aims and strategies, they pursue. With the recent and most regretful break-out of violence in the new Republic of South Sudan last December, it became advisable to widen the scope and to focus more on the regional dimensions of this abrupt break-out of violence. By mid February 2014, the Deputy Executive Secretary, Ambassador Vicente Muanda requested ii) a sound study on the causes of conflict in the Republic of South Sudan and the Central African Republic.

Both requests were very challenging, especially because the interested contemporary is quickly confronted with myriads of armed groups fighting against each other and out of any control of the central government. For tackling this task, such groups first have to be brought in a certain order by identifying their actions, activities and events. No wonder are many publications thus marked by the political mimicry in the countryside or biased by distinct political interests. Luckily, I discovered by mid-march some very helpful scholarly literature, which I widely used for this text.

As distinguished from many other publications applies this text a regional perspective, by combining the turmoils in South Sudan and the Central African Republic with the politically convoluted processes in Chad and Sudan. Most of the political manoeuvres can be slightly differently and in my eyes much better be understood, if one refers to a regional analytical approach. In addition, such a perspective complies much better with the ICGLR profile as it allows singling out its trump cards.

The study is subdivided in three parts. While the first part investigates the role and profile of the most important stakeholders in the CAR and South Sudan, widens the second part the scope by analysing these processes in the light of a regional understanding. The third part finally takes the history of the most important peace-keeping missions into account, presents the recommendations of two important think tanks and outlines the basic points for a future regional ICGLR intervention.

I hope, this paper attracts your interest.

Markus Weilenmann, Bujumbura, May 25, 2014

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Introduction

Today, the Republics of South Sudan and the Central African Republic are the showplace of direful conflicts, which again risk mushrooming to a wildland fire all over the region. Those, who investigate on the causes of the current conflicts are facing a gruesome political history of ongoing clashes, massacres, rebellions and societal turmoils that is dating back until the early days of independency. Leading political analysts of the region prefer thus speaking of a web of conflicts (Behrends, 2007; Prunier, 2007, 2009) and attract notice to their regional dimension. In a very interesting paper, Giroux, Lanz and Sguitamatti (2009) capture the regional dimension by the image of a "tormented triangle". My paper - entitled as "a fateful governance rectangle" - pays tribute to their figure of thought. Like the "tormented triangle" paper it analyses not only the conflicting web within the respective nation states, but focuses also on the regional side relating to that dynamic of conflict layers. All interpretations stress thus the impact of the conflicting web on the run of politics in the Central African Republic and the Republic of South Sudan, in due consideration of the Republics of Sudan and Chad.

Giroux, Lanz and Sguitamatti introduce their working paper with a very telling conflict analyses relating to some tensions between the Chad and Sudan, which I quote here in some length as it shows quite nicely the regional challenges and dynamics:

> In February 2008, approximately four thousand rebels from eastern Chad travelled a thousand kilometres across the entire country to attack the capital N'Djamena, with the aim of ousting President Idriss Déby. At first sight this seemed to be a strictly Chadian affair; an attack by a disenfranchised group of men from one of Chad's marginalised peripheries against their corrupt government. However, a closer look reveals a more complicated regional picture. The weapons and pick-up trucks that the Chadian rebels used in the attack were provided by the Sudanese government in Khartoum. The rebels had prepared their attack in western Darfur and north-eastern Central African Republic (CAR), and many fighters among their ranks were mercenaries from these areas. Déby was nearly ousted, but in the end he managed to repel the rebellion and stay in power. The reason for this is that the leaders of the main groups attacking N'Djamena - the *Union des forces pour la démocratie et le développement* and the *Rassemblement des forces pour le changement* - quarrelled over who would succeed him. Furthermore, the rebels became bogged down and run out of ammunition. France, a longstanding ally of Déby, decided to support him and allow weapons provided by Libya to reach the Chadian capital. Also crucial was the military support of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), a rebel group from western Sudan, whose leadership hails from the same tribe as Déby - the Zaghawa.

Already this short summary of the failed 2008 coup d'État in Chad indicates the complexity of the task to analyse the causes of these conflicts. Just within these few lines, we encounter an entire list of important stakeholders such as the Chadian President Idriss Déby, France,

Libya, rebels organised in competing political networks invading from the warfare area of Darfur (Sudan) and the north-east of the Central African Republic, the political role of the Zaghawa tribe and finally Khartoum as synonym of the ruling political class of Sudan in the backstage.

Analytically, this paper distinguishes a series of different conflict layers: conflicts at grass-roots level, such as conflicts of interest between different ethnic groups, road bandits and rebel movements on the ground (i); conflicts at institutional level, esp. those between institutions supportive of the state, as they may indicate the deepness of dissent expressed in a rising fragmentation within the state structure (ii); conflicts within governments, as they may lead to important blockings and/or end in a confrontational style of governance combined with a growing use of violence in order to discipline dissenting wings (iii); transnational and transborder conflicts at the mid-level of society (f.i. conflicts caused by transborder ethnic groups, mercenaries etc.) due to the incapacity to control the entire territory (iv); conflicts between governments at the regional level due to geopolitical interests and power constellations (v); and global impacts such as access questions to important natural resources by the world powers and global trade chains (vi).

All these possible conflict layers are nourished by a set of already well-known structural causes such as fragmented states, power vacuums in hinterlands, presence of transborder ethnic groups, young armed men in search of the next war (youth unemployment!), perpetual regional instability, the access to as well as the amount of natural resources at disposal (oil, diamonds, gold, coltan etc.) and the ways, governments and international agencies try to "manage" and "engineering" such conflicts[1] (cf. Autesserre 2010; von Benda-Beckmann, F. 2006; Rottenburg 2010; von Trotha 1999; Uvin 1998). Of course, all these different structural causes are not all shaped by the same way; they have different forms and entail distinct dynamics depending of their variable specifications they get within the respective conflict settings and they entail different consequences, which, in the worst case, may again impact on the run of the entire conflict web.

Given such perpetual motion processes, it is thus important to apply a generic analytical framework in order to clearly differentiate between the various conflict dynamics (actors, actions and events) and the more profound calculations of the conflict parties, their strategising and the conflicting normative framework conditions by which the current actions are

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[1] Many international development plans on conflict resolution contain the danger of shifting original political conflicts on a technical stage in order to handle them by the current models of project management without developing appropriate concepts of how to bring back such technical solutions then on the political stage. And afterwards one wonders why the seemingly nice-looking technical solutions failed and tries to improve the degree of differentiation of the technical manuals and hand-outs. But this is a rarely considered dead end. For details see esp. Rottenburg 2010

formed. Giroux, Lanz and Sguitamatti reduced the complexity of these connections to the following graph:

| Structure | **Triggers** → | Dynamics | **Triggers** → | Regional Conflict System |

←——————————————————————————

(cf. Giroux, Lanz and Sguitamatti 2009:2)

The present paper is subdivided into 3 major parts, each subdivided in several chapters. The *first part* is the largest one. It outlines the most principal conflict actors, actions and events, and analyses the ways, they are intermingled with each other in the two focal countries, the Central African Republic and the Republic of South Sudan. Also, it investigates on their political history and the multifaceted ways, these actors came to the fore. The *second part*, much smaller but not less important, identifies and analyses the perpetual motion processes of conflict. It handles the most important structural triggers and shows how they boost the regional conflict system without neglecting their retroverse impacts, i.e. how regional conflicts may impact on the structural triggers within the different nation states and thus adding new conflict layers at different local, national and regional levels. The *third and last part* is conclusive and it discusses the strategic proposals of important international stakeholders and outlines a possible schedule for an ICGLR intervention on the spot. Of course, for most of the regional key-factors, the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region already developed strategic programme clusters, which could entail a constructive turn. However, as most of these programmes are embedded in the Regional Framework Agreement, signed on 24 February 2013 in Addis Ababa and therefore to a certain extend are broken down to the specific and partly anticipated conflict patterns in DRC, they have slightly to be revised in order to tackle the particular conflict constellation in the fateful governance rectangle. The last section contains thus some strategic proposals for the short, medium and long term strategies in order to settle down this direful conflict system.

The study relies essentially on leading literature and available web-information on the dodgy conflict patterns in the Central African Republic and South Sudan under due consideration of the Republics of Sudan and Chad. In addition, it relies on some illuminative and helpful comments by the ICGLR Programme Officer André Samba (CAR) and the ICGLR Legal Advisor Abd Almageed Awad Eisa (Sudan), to whom I am very grateful. Nevertheless, as author of this text I remain entirely responsible for all committed errors, mistakes and misunderstandings.

Part 1 Actors, Actions and Events

For initiating political change in the governance rectangle, the overthrow or destruction of governments in power makes rather the rule. Many different actors or actor-groups attached to common clusters of interest are involved in such violent processes. This chapter presents the country profiles, the profile of the most important actors within the corresponding conflicting webs and the time line of their actions and events.

1 The Central African Republic

1.1 CARs rebel movements

The Central African Republic has a rich past of interaction between a multiplicity of rebel groups and military governments. The *Séléka* and the *Anti-Balaka* movements are only the last of an entire chain of rebel movements which were intermingled with a number of military regimes and dictators since almost its first days of independency. Quickly, interested contemporaries are thus confronted with a broad field of different rebel groups, all operating under different abbreviations, which might render it difficult for outsiders to get a comprehensive understanding of the underlying processes. Before the rise of *Séléka* for instance, under the auspices of the Gabonese President *Omar Bongo* a comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the Central African Republic's government and different rebel groups was signed at 21 June 2008 in Libreville (Gabon). The three most important rebel groups at that time had each signed separate accords with the government before. But unfortunately, all these accords failed their goal again. Obviously, the differences between the various goals, intentions, strategies and interests of the concerned rebel groups are much deeper and did not fit well with the formally agreed normative frameworks. Who are thus these rebel groups, with whom are they linked and of what profile do they dispose?[2]

Séléka

The **Séléka** (meaning "union" in the Sango language) is a coalition of previous rebel groups with an orientation towards the promotion of the Islam. Many of them were previously involved in the "Central African Republic Bush War", which officially ended by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2008. The rebels accused the government of president François *Bozizé* of failing to abide by peace agreements signed in 2007, 2008 and 2011. *Séléka* comprises two major groups based in north-eastern CAR: the Union of Democratic Forces for Unity (UFDR) and the Convention of Patriots for Justice and Peace (CPJP), but it also includes the lesser known Patriotic Convention for Saving the Country (CPSK). Two other groups based in northern CAR, the Democratic Front of the Central African Republic (FDPC) and the Chadian group Popular Front for Recovery (FPR) also announced their allegiance to the *Séléka* coalition. In addition, important parts of the APRD joined *Sé-*

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[2] except not otherwise noticed, all collected information of this chapter rely on corresponding wikipedia and international institution websites such as the websites of the UN, reliefweb, IRIN and so on.

léka as well. When the Séléka rebel alliance captured the capital-city Bangui last March 2013, heavily armed and well-trained wildlife poachers and mercenary fighters from Chad and Sudan - some of whom were according to the American NGO **!enough** "members of the Sudanese government-supported Janjaweed militia" (Agger, 2014:1) - backed the group.

Popular Army for the Restoration of the Republic and Democracy

(APRD)

Before the foundation of Séléka, the **APRD** (Armée Populaire pour la réstauration de la République et de la Démocratie) was the most widespread rebel movement on Central African soil. It occupied most of the territory between *Ngaounday / Bocaranga* in the northwest and *Kaga-Bandoro/Kabo* in the north. It came into existence immediately after the presidential elections of *Bozizé* in 2005. Its membership is heterogeneous. Among its ranks are deserters of the Central African Armed Forces (FACA), Central African 'ex-liberators', Chadian 'ex-liberators', local self-defence groups and converted road bandits (for more details on the road-cutters see below). (cf. Spittaels and Hilgert, 2009:7-9).

The command structure is equally complex. The former Minister of Defence of President *Ange-Felix Patassé*, Mr. *Jean-Jacques Demafouth*, was the leader in charge of negotiating with the *Bozizé* government in 2008, and with a number of military commanders. He was also presidential candidate for the 2005 elections and in August 2013, he joined the former (*Séléka-*) President Michel Djotodia as Minister close to the presidency, and in charge of the DDR-programme. In between, he lived in Paris from where he pulled the strings as influent master puppeteer[3].

In the field, the most influential leader was however *'Colonel' Laurent Dijm-Woei Bebiti*, who was generally referred to as spokesman. In addition, APRD boosted also two other colonels and even a general. Finally, a 'general' with a Chadian background called *'Douman' or 'Doumro'* has been spotted on several occasions among APRD ranks. Except Mr. *Jean-Jacques Demafouth*, all these other persons have <u>no relation</u> to *Patassé*. The reasons for fighting of the APRD can be summarised as follows:

- The country suffers from foreign aggression. Chadian elements that helped *President Bozizé* come to power in 2003, have become road bandits and spread terror (see below).
- The state security services commit grave human rights violations.
- The economy was destroyed by the current regime. *Bozizé* and his allies marched on Bangui plundering and looting and they continued to do so after they took power.
- The *Bozizé* regime betrayed the country and had therefore to be replaced. It was perceived that radical changes would be necessary.

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[3] Under President Patassé, Mr Jean-Jacques Demafouth already acted as Minister of Defence. Also, he was involved in the Congolese "Bemba-Case" which is currently negotiated at the International Criminal Court.

On the 9th of May 2008, the APRD was the last of the major rebel groups to sign the peace agreement with the CAR in Libreville (capital city of Gabon) but like many others, also this agreement remained dead paper.

Union of Democratic Forces for Unity (UFDR)

The **UFDR** was created in September 2006 as an alliance between three separate sub-groups. At that time, the two leading figures of the movement were its chairman *Michel Am Nondroko Djotodia* and its spokesman *Abakar Sabone*. Both leaders were arrested shortly after the UFDRs major attacks against *Birao, Ndélé, Sam-Ouandja* and *Ouadda* in September and October 2006. The group fought against the government in the CAR and was accused by the *Bozizé-Regime* of being backed by the government of Sudan.

Since its creation, the core of the rebel movement had always been formed by combatants from the *Gulu* community. Other ethnicities were represented as well, especially the *Runga*, who constitute the second largest community in the region. However, the movement has become almost exclusively dominated by the ethnic group of the Gula. Its ethnic shift has affected its legitimacy (for details see Spittaels and Hilgert, 2009).

Democratic Front of the Central African People (FDPC)

Before joining the *Séléka*, the **FDPC** was considered as the third rebel movement that controlled parts of the CARs territory, though only a very small area. Until November 2008, it seemed that FDPC had ceased to exist as an active military movement, but later, its military wing merged to the *Séléka*, where it has been reactivated.

The leader of the FDPC is a confidant of former President *Patassé* who goes by the name of *Abdoulaye Miskine*. His real name is *Martin Koumta Madji* and he is rumoured to be at least half-Chadian. In 2009, he resided in Tripoli, Libya, allegedly under the protection of the former President *Gaddafi*. Within international diplomatic circles it is assumed that Libya was behind the revival of the FDPC. FDPC was the first of the CARs rebel groups to sign a ceasefire agreement with the *Bozizé-Government* in December 2006 in Syrte, Libya, but it had never signed any of the following peace agreements (2007, 2008, 2011). Before the creation of the political melting pot *Séléka*, relations between FDPC and the former rebel group APRD were rather tense.

Convention of Patriots for Justice and Peace (CPJP)

The **CPJP** rebel group is based in the north-eastern CAR and comprised primarily of Rounga tribesmen. This rebel group is remarkably well organized, equipped, and run compared with other ragtag rebel groups in the CAR. The CPJP was originally said to be made up of UFDR members of the Rounga tribe who broke with the *Goula* dominated UFDR after being expelled from the diamond fields near Sam Ouandja (for more details see www.globalsecurity.org).

Anti-Balaka	"**Anti-balaka**" is the term used to refer to the Christian militias formed in the CAR after the rise to power of *Michel Djotodia* (03.2013 - 01.2014). In the local *Sango* and *Mandja* languages, *"Anti-balaka"* means "anti-machete" or "anti-sword". Other sources derive the term from the French word "balle". *"Anti-balaka"* could thus insinuate their (assumed) invulnerability by bullets. *"Anti-balaka"* fighters are known by their application of gris-gris techniques. The movement never disposed of a clear command structure. Many different leaders are since long claiming to be "coordinator". In May 2014, a new name raised, the one of *Sébastien Wénezo*. His principal rival is *Patrice Edouard Ngaissona*. The *"Anti-Balaka"*- rebel movement is a sort of backlash of the *Séléka-Rebellion*. The increasing violence was largely from reprisal attacks targeted on civilians from ex-*Sélékas*. As many Christians had sedentary lifestyles and many Muslims were nomadic, claims to the land were yet another layer of the tensions. In February 2014, Amnesty International already reported several massacres committed by *Anti-balakas* against civilians, forcing thousands of Muslims to flee the country. Until now (05. 2014), almost the entire Muslim population left the country.
Lord Resistance Army (LRA)	In addition, also the **Lord Resistance Army** extended its activities and from 2007 onwards, it is reported that they were as well active in the Central African Republic. In February and March 2008, the LRA carried out a series of raids that stuck the Southeast of the CAR. Since 2013 it is feared that the LRA will use the CAR and the RSS as its new home base, because it is being pushed militarily away by the fight of the MONUSCO and the Ugandan Defence Forces UDF against its classical home bases in Eastern DRC and North Uganda.
"Road-Cutters" or "Zaraguinas"	And finally, one should not omit the "**zaraguinas**" or "**road-cutters**"*,* as these gangs of road bandits are named in English. During the past years, such ragtag bandits have operated all over the CAR but currently, they are most active in the North-East (*Paoua, Ouham-Pendé*)[4]. The *coupeurs* - as they are called in French - attack transports and travellers using CAR's dilapidated roads. Obviously, they are not selective in choosing their targets. In the past, farmers, cattle drivers, merchants and even humanitarians have all fallen victim to attacks by these road-cutter gangs. It is reported, that they are dressed in military uniforms or in black clothing (reminiscent of Japanese ninja fighters in films), are all armed with assault rifles and make often use of extreme violence. The *zaraguinas* are not a new phenomenon, however.

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[4] In *Paoua*, several conflict layers come to the fore. *Paoua*, about 60 km far from the Chadian border and 500 kms far from Bangui (distant from the central government), is located at a classical transit axe and thus of particular interest for the zaraguinas. At the beginning, the zaraguinas were *Mbororo* pastoralists, equipped with very primitive arms and which started to be specialised on the pillaging of passing trucks. Only later, they widened their scope and improved their ammunition. Behind this conflict pattern however lurk ongoing conflicts between the sedentary farmers and the Chadian pastoralists, which are legendary in that region.

> They have existed since decades but their composition has altered and their activity has increased. The early bandits were largely foreigners from Cameroon, Chad, and even Niger who came especially to the CAR to practise banditry.

As a result of this governance problem (security!), several self-defence groups have come to the fore, especially in the North of the CAR. Initially, their prime targets were indeed the road bandits, but later they started to fight against other rebel groups such as the APRD, as because of their involvement in a growing number of human rights violations their popularity was decreasing in the sub-prefectures of *Paoua* and *Nangha Bogulia*. Other groups came under the influence of Bangui (*Bozizé-, and Djotodia-Regime*) and got, through the local prefects or other intermediaries, qualified support from the respective presidencies.

1.2   Patterns of (ethno-)clientele-governance in the Central African Republic

On the top-level of society, the fragmentation of rebel and self-help groups is paralleled by a very turbulent history of military coups, which never achieved to stabilize the country and to improve the political control beyond the capital city and the direct profiteers of its patronage structure. It is thus not really reasonable why in the next few months exactly the current president, Ms *Cathrine Samba Panza*[5], just in power since slightly more than 100 days, could bring peace, stability, accountability and economic growth to her country suffering of such a bloody and convoluted history of power conflicts since the early days of independency. As long as the structural problems of governance such as its (ethno-)clientele structure are not tabled, challenged and revised, a fundamental change will not occur.

Looking closer, one discovers already after independence the development of the current conflict pattern: Directly following independence, CAR endured already an uncounted number of military coups until 1965. With the 1st January 1966, when former colonial soldier *Jean-Bédel Bokassa* overthrew *President David Dacko*, a seemingly stable period of governance until the end of 1979 was launched. However, President Bokassa's style of reign leaned a lot on royal and later even imperial archetypes, which finally were matched by a growing use of brute violence. Initially, President Bokassa got support from France. But due to the increasing brutality of his regime decided France to abandon him. *Bokassa* then sought Libyen backing. But in September 1979, he was restored to power by the former *President David Dacko.* In 1981 however, the state military, led by General *André Kolingba*, took over power. *Kolingba* was a member of the *Yakoma* tribe and catered mainly to the *Yakoma-*populated southern belt of CAR. According to Berg[6] (2008:20), *Kolingba's* rule brought in a

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[5] Just because Ms Samba Panza is the first female president of the Central African Republic? That's an empty dream castle.
[6] quoted by Giroux, Lanz and Sguitamatti 2009:5

period *"establishing for the first time ethnic identity as the crucial factor in the political culture of the CAR."*

In the course of the winds of change in the early 1990s also the Central African Republic got under growing external pressure to democratise its political structures and to launch democratic election processes for the selection of its national leaders. In 1993 *Kolingba* thus lost aigainst *Ange-Félix Patassé* - a politician who came from both the *Gbaya* and *Kare* tribes, yet grew up in *Paoua* in the north, which is home to the *Kaba* tribe. Patassé was very keen to weaken the *Yakoma*-dominated military and to stack the French-backed Presidential Guard with members from the *Kaba* thus perpetuating the political exploitation of ethnicity (cf. Ngoupandé 1997). These divisions then fuelled violence, led to the forming of ethnic based rebel organisations and finally, the African peacekeeping force known as *Mission interafricaine de surveillance des accords de Bangui* (MISAB) was created for monitoring and quelling rising hostilities. France thus sought for an exit strategy out of CAR's deteriorating political and social landscape. Deprived from the former colonial patron, Patassé similar to Bokassa then lobbied for Libyan support. With this, the *Gaddafi*-created *Community of the Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD)* got involved and provided a peacekeeping force for Patassé and his presidential guard. Additional backing came from the Congolese rebel group *"Mouvement pour la libération du Congo"* led by Jean-Pierre Bemba.

The former President *François Bozizé* as well as the later rebel leader and short-time President *Michel Djotodia* are both two typical children of this turbulent and violent history, though their respective careers contrast to each other. *François Bozizé*, born in Gabon in 1946, attended a military officers' training college in the CAR's north-eastern province before getting integrated into the governmental structures of several succeeding military regimes. Under President *André Kolingba* he was first appointed as communication minister, but later, his engagement was overshadowed by accusations of plotting a coup. From 1989 until 1991, he was imprisoned and tortured. In the same year, he lost the elections against *Patassé*, who then appointed him in 1996 as army chief of staff. In November 2001, he was sacked in connection with a failed coup attempt by *Kolingba*, who meanwhile kicked *Patassé* out of power. *Bozizé* then sought refuge in Chad. On 25 October 2002, he claimed responsibility for a coup attempt foiled by Congolese militiamen loyal to former rebel leader *Jean-Pierre Bemba*. And in March 2003, he launched another attack and finally entered Bangui (March 15, 2003).

Michel Djotodia, President of the CAR from March 2013 to January 2014, was the first Muslim holding that position. His rise to power however came from his outside rebel activities. In 2006, he was amongst the founders and a leading member of the rebel group "Union of Democratic Forces for Unity". By late 2006, he was arrested by the government of *François Bozizé*. Released in early 2008, he became the leader of the Muslim rebel platform *Séléka*, which got form after the "Central African Republic Bush War". After replacing *Bozizé* in March 2013, he promised to lead a transition government to new elections in which he would not be a candidate, but growing hatred, escalating ethno-religious massacres and sec-

tarian violence pressured him to resign already in January 2014, before gaining confidence, trust and money from European (France) or Asian (China) sponsors.

1.3   The Time Line of Central African Rebellions since 2006[7]

2006   On November 2006, thousands of people marched into the capital Bangui and pleaded for the government's troops to confront the UFDR. 20 members of the government were killed, and only 3 rebels died in this attack. UFDR fighters then gained access to several armoured vehicles, including one plane(!). Later that month *Sam-Ouandja* and *Ouadda* had been captured by the rebels. This captures entailed thousands of IDPs who mainly fled to *Bambari* and *Bangui*. Rumours also indicated an additional attack in *Ndele*. In December 2006, Chadian troops in three army trucks attacked *Bémal*, located next to *Bétoko*, firing randomly at the population and plundered farming goods (32 cows, sacks of peanuts, farming implements etc.).

2007   After the signing of a peace agreement by FDPCs, French Mirage jets bombed the UFDR headquarters in *Birao* and forced this way the UFDR to sign a peace agreement (April 1, 2007). Both peace agreements orient themselves at DDR models. FDPC fighters negotiated their integration into the official army FACA, the liberation of political prisoners, and their integration into government positions. The UFDR-agreement provides an amnesty, its recognition as a political party, and the integration of its fighters into the national army. In August 2007, *Miskine* was appointed as a presidential adviser, but he rejected that appointment and claimed already the violation of the *Syrte* agreement, which eventually failed to protect him from prosecution by the International Criminal Court (ICC). At that time, the ICC started investigations on numerous war crimes that allegedly occurred during *Bozizé's* 2002-03 Coup d'État against the *Patassé* regime.

2008   On May 9 2008, the APRD signed the cease fire and peace agreement (CPA) with the government in Libreville (Gabun). *Jean-Jacques Demafouth* signed on behalf of the APRD and DDR minister *Cyriaque Gonda* on behalf of the *Bozizé*-regime. The APRD agreement paved also the way for further peace talks. On 21 June 2008, the FDPC joined the APRD and UFDR Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), signed in Libreville, which reiterated and extended the provisions of the previous two agreements. On August 2008, the CPJP finally ac-

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[7] This composition refers mainly to a well researched site of Wikipedia, see
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Central_African_Republic_Bush_War

ceded the CPA as well. But unfortunately, all these agreements remained dead paper.

2011   The CPJP and UFDR continued fighting on the access to natural resources (diamonds) in western CAR (*Bria*). In April, CPJP sent some signals of being ready for additional peace negotiations but conditionalised them for getting clarifications on the status of its former head *Charles Massi*, who eventually had been tortured and killed in a government prison. After intensified government and international mediation efforts, the CPJP signed another ceasefire agreement on June 12. Nevertheless, violence soon resumed and more than 50 deaths were reported in September 2011. In October 2011, CPJP signed another peace agreement with UFDR (now aligned with the government) in *Bangui*, calling for the demilitarization of *Bria*.

2012/13   On December 10 2012, other conflicts with rebel groups restarted accusing *President Bozizé* of violating the terms of their earlier agreements. The new rebel coalition *Séléka* overthrew Bozizé and took the capital Bangui on March 24, 2013. Rebel leader *Michel Djotodia* (formerly UFDR) declared himself President of the Central African Republic. Already in January 2014, he was forced to resign by the Chadian Government and by France due to increasing ethno-religious massacres and attempts for genocide.

2014   Currently Ms *Cathrine Samba-Panza* accomplishes the functions of a President in CAR. Though she considers her government as a "transitional government", fights are ongoing. Almost the total Muslim population has meanwhile left the country.

The next elections are projected for February 2015.

Crosscutting relations with Chadian rebels are a very common feature within the Central-African conflict time line, but there are also many links to South Sudan and Sudan. Neighbouring Chad and Sudan are for instance accused by the American NGO **!enough** of having *"provided support to the Séléka with the goal of installing a cooperative government that could help protect Chadian oil interests and prevent CAR from becoming a safe haven for rebels that could potentially destabilize the two countries. South Africa deployed up to 400 soldiers to protect South African investments in the oil and diamond sectors when François Bozizé was in office"* (Agger, May 2014:1). **!enough** points also to the implicit dangers of media coverage relating only to the nation states such as the new conflicts in South Sudan and it stresses *"escalating violence, displacement, and new political developments in the areas along Sudan's periphery - Darfur, South Kordofan, and Blue Nile"* (Prendergast 02.2014:1).

And the **International Crisis Group** outlines the limits of the Darfur Peace Process by re-considering the dangers of Sudan's Spreading Conflict[8].

> Giroux, Lanz and Sguitamatti (2009:3) thus rightly state that *"Chad, CAR and Sudan, each represent a 'thread' that is defined not only by its borders, but more so by multiple ethnic groups, languages, traditions, potential economic benefits and beliefs. Such elements are further woven into a vast and diverse topography that ranges from dense forest and savannah in the south to long stretches of arid deserts in the north."*

Clear state boundaries are thus challenged at any time by the reality of porous borders, which improve the mobility of goods, people and criminal ideologies out of control, contributing to a great fluidity and to the patchwork nature of warfare in this region.

2 The Republic of South Sudan

2.1 The emergence of a new nation state

The Republic of South Sudan is the world's youngest nation. It is the 193rd member state of the United Nations and the 54th member state of the African Union. The country gained independence on 9th July 2011 following a self determination referendum in which the citizens overwhelmingly voted for total autonomy from the then Sudan. The referendum, conducted in January 2011, was one of the provisions of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed in 2005. The CPA ended one of Africa's longest civil wars in which many lives were lost. However, after emerging from decades of neglect and discrimination, the country troubles again with its process of nation building and has plunged in a new civil war, when Opposition leaders *Riek Machar*, *Pagan Amum* and *Rebecca Nyandeng* voted to boycott the Sunday December 15, 2013 meeting of the National Liberation Council (NLC)[9]. As of February 2014, South Sudan is host to over 230'000 refugees, with the vast majority, or over 209'000, having arrived recently from Sudan. Other African countries that contribute the most refugees to South Sudan are the Central African Republic, Ethiopia, and the Democratic Republic

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[8] International Crisis Group (01. 2014): Sudan's Spreading Conflict (III): The Limits of Darfur's Peace Process. Africa Report Nr. 211/ 27 January 2014

[9] For details, see Chapter 2.3

of the Congo. There are also 740'000 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in South Sudan since December 2013, almost 75'000 of whom reside in UN bases. UNHCR has reported a drop in the number of IDPs seeking protection, despite a growth in the overall IDP population in South Sudan. Consequently, UNHCR is stepping up its response through an inter-agency collaborative approach under the leadership of the Humanitarian Coordinator, and working with the International Organization for Migration (IOM). In early February 2013, UNHCR started distributing relief items outside the UN base in Malakal, South Sudan, which reached about 10'000 people (cf. www.irin.org).

International Crisis Group (2014/217)[10] convincingly argues that the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (2005) unfortunately *"excluded other political and military opposition groups in both North and South. In the years following, many southern groups were absorbed into the SPLM/A, which, however, never forged a joint platform representative of its diverse membership. After independence, dissatisfaction increased, and many blamed the leadership for failing to deliver on much needed security and basic services. The divisions between combatants and communities that characterised so much of the conflict following the 1991 split within the SPLM/A were not reconciled during the critical CPA period. Today, in the midst of spiralling ethnic violence, many communities are aligning themselves with military factions, giving the conflict a dangerous ethno-military nature reminiscent of past conflicts with the SPLA"*(2014/217:3). The Crisis Group continues to criticize that both, South Sudanese and the international community were ill-prepared to prevent or halt the conflict: *"(The) nations closest allies did little to mediate leadership divisions within the Sudan Peoples' Liberation Movement's (SPLM). The SPLM and its army (SPLA) quickly split along divisions largely unaddressed from the independence war. Were it not for the intervention of Uganda and allied rebel and militia groups, the SPLA would likely not have been able to hold Juba or recapture lost territory"*(2014/217:i).

A deeper look inside of the political train reveals a quite similar picture of political fragmentation as already described for the Central African Republic. Again, we are confronted with a multitude of different stakeholders, who all keep the wheels of that deadly war machine running.

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[10] cf. International Crisis Group (04.2014): South Sudan: A Civil War by Any Other Name. Africa Report Nr. 217 / 10 April 2014

2.2 Actors and actor clusters of the Republic of South Sudan

Salva Kiir
President of the
Republic of
South Sudan

Following the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement formally ending the war in January 2005, Dr. *John Garang* was sworn in as the Vice President of the Republic of Sudan. After his death in a helicopter crash on July 30 2005, **Salva Kiir** was chosen to succeed to the post of First Vice President of Sudan and President of Southern Sudan. Before independence, *Kiir* was popular among the military wing of the SPLA/M for his loyalty to the vision of the SPLA/M throughout the liberation struggle and among those who distrusted the successive governments in Sudan.

Kiir was re-elected with 93% of the votes in the 2010 Sudanese election. Although the vote on both the national and sub-national level was criticized by democratic activists and international observers, the overwhelming margin of *Kiir's* re-election was noted by some media as being "Step One" in the process of secession. Following his re-election, *Omar al-Bashir* reappointed *Kiir* in accordance with the interim constitution as the First Vice President of Sudan.

After rumours on a planned coup surfaced in Juba late 2012, *Kiir* began reorganizing the senior leadership of his government, his party and military in an unprecedented scale. In January 2013, he replaced the inspector general of the national police service with a lieutenant from the army, and dismissed six deputy chiefs of staff and 29 major generals in the army. In February 2013 *Kiir* retired an additional 117 army generals; but this was viewed as troublesome in regards to a power grab by others. *Kiir* had also suggested that his rivals were trying to revive the rifts which had provoked infighting in the 1990s.

Riek Machar
Vice-President of
the Republic of
South Sudan

Riek Machar is a rebel leader with the Sudan People's Liberation Army/ Movement (SPLM/A), headed by *John Garang* from 1984-1991. As Zonal Commander of Western Upper Nile, in 1986 he entered into an agreement with *Baggara chiefs*. *Riek* led forces that attacked and overran *Melut* in 1989. Later he was appointed SPLA Regional Commander for a region that extended from the Ethiopian border in the east to *Renk* in the north and to *Ayod* and *Waat* in the south.

Riek disagreed with *John Garang* over objectives. While John *Garang* opted for a secular and democratic but united Sudan in which the southerners would have full representation, Riek wanted a fully independent South Sudan.

During the 1990s *Riek* skilfully developed support among the *eastern Nuer*, the *Jikany* and the *Lou*, taking advantage of SPLA unpopularity with the *Jikany* and drawing on prophetic tradition to make his case. In 1996 *Riek* signed a Political Charter and in 1997 the Khartoum Peace Agreement with the government. Under this agreement he was assistant to *Omar el-Bashir,* President of Sudan, and President of the Southern States Coordinating Council. He was also made commander in chief of the South Sudan Defense Force (SSDF), which included

Riek Machar	most of the ex-rebels who had signed the Khartoum agreement. *Riek Machar's* failure to prevent the government from forcibly dis-placing civilians from the oil-producing areas of Unity State turned the *Nuer* against his leadership. *Riek's* SSDF began to receive ammunition from the SPLA as of June 1999. In 2000 at a meeting of leaders in *Koch* he finally resigned from the government of Sudan and created a fresh militia named the SPDF.
	The civil war ended in January 2005. In August *Riek* became Vice President of the Government of Southern Sudan and SPLM Co-Chair of the Joint Executive Political Committee. When South Sudan became independent, in July 2011 he was appointed first Vice President of the new republic. He is now accused by President *Salva Kiir* of a failed coup d'état on 16 December 2013; though he denied being involved he is now being called the leader of the rebel move-ment.
Sudan People's Defence Forces/ Democratic Front (**SPDF**)	The **Sudan People's Defence Forces/Democratic Front** (**SPDF**) was an anti-government militia active in Upper Nile from 2000 to 2002. *Riek Machar* formed the SPDF mostly from deserters of the pro-Khartoum South Sudan Defence Forces (SSDF) and later merged it with the SPLM/A.
Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA)	The **Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA)** is today the army of the Republic of South Sudan. Originally, the SPLA was founded in reaction to President *Gaafar Nimeiry's* attempts to introduce Muslim political governance, which included imposing sharia law. It was a key participant of the Second Sudanese Civil War. Throughout the war, it was led by *John Garang de Mabior*.
	With the north receiving external support from its Muslim neighbours, such as Libya, the SPLA was aided in particular by *Mengistu's* Ethiopia and by *Museveni's* Uganda (De Waal 2007a, 2007b). Regional alliances as well as cross-border movements of armed groups were a key factor during the second Sudanese civil war from 1983 to 2005 (cf. Giroux, Lanz and Sguitamatti 2009).
	Following *John Garang's* death, *Salva Kiir Mayardit* was named the new Com-mander-in-Chief of SPLA. As of 2013, the SPLA was estimated to have 210,000 soldiers and an unknown number of personnel in the small South Sudan Air Force. The SPLA was divided into divisions of 10,000-14,000 soldiers. Following the independence of South Sudan in 2011 the SPLA became the regular army of the new republic. According to International Crisis Group (2014/217:5) is the SPLA not only the largest army but also the most important institution in South Sudan: *"Multi-ethnic from the outset, its constituent groups and divides between them reflect the bitter interethnic history of the liberation struggle."*
Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM)	The **Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM)** is a Conservative political party in South Sudan. It was initially founded as the political wing of the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA, key protagonist of the Second Sudanese Civil War) in 1983. On January 9, 2005 the SPLA, SPLM and Government of Sudan signed a Comprehensive Peace Agreement, ending the civil war. SPLM then

obtained representation in the Government of Sudan, and was the main constituent of the Government of the then semi-autonomous Southern Sudan. When South Sudan became a sovereign state on 9 July 2011, SPLM became the ruling party of the new republic. SPLM branches in Sudan separated themselves from SPLM, forming the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North.

Nuer White Army

The **Nuer White Army**, sometimes also named the "white army", is a semi-official appellation[11] for a militant organisation formed by the *Nuer* people of central and eastern Greater Upper Nile in modern-day South Sudan as early as 1991. According to the Small Arms Survey, it arose from the 1991 schism within the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) for the dual purpose of defending Nuer cattle herds from neighbouring groups and fighting in the Second Sudanese Civil War between the SPLM/A and the Sudanese government.

In the current conflict, after *Dinka* elements of the Presidential Guard and other security organs have engaged in systematic violence against the *Nuer* in *Juba*, armed actors including the Nuer White Army responded by targeting *Dinka* and other civilians in more than a dozen of locations[12].

Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)

The **Justice and Equality Movement** is originally a Sudanese opposition group founded around 2000. Ideologically, it advocates for replacing the dictatorship of *Omar al-Bashir* and the ruling Congress Party with a civil, democratic state that respects the rights of Sudan's various ethnic groups, women, and youth. The JEM further committed itself to these principles when it signed the New Dawn Charter in January 2013. JEM is an ethnically inclusive movement including Black Africans and Arabs and it therefore became the largest opposition network among the groups opposed to the government of president *Omar al Bashir*. JEM is part of the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF), an alliance of groups opposed to the government in Khartoum that include the Sudan Liberation Movement (*Abdul Wahed*), the Sudan Liberation Movement (*Minnawi*) and the Sudan Liberation Movement - North.

After separation between Sudan and South Sudan, JEM broadened its activities and developed good relations to the government of South Sudan in order to use the new republic as a host and safe haven. Therefore, with the new outbreak of violence in South Sudan, JEM intervened early in support of the South Sudanese government. However, that turn may yet trigger Sudan government support to the SPLA in Opposition and this way to complicate again an already convoluted and protracted conflict constellation.

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[11] The White Army was so named due to the Nuer practice of smearing one's skin with a light-coloured ash as a protection against biting insects, according to a Small Arms Survey report published in June 2007, though other sources contend the name was merely intended to draw a distinction between the Nuer militia and the Sudan Armed Forces.

[12] (see the geographical battle chart in the annexe)

South Sudan Defence Forces (SSDF)	The **South Sudan Defence Forces** (**SSDF**) is a Nuer dominated militia and was primarily active in the Second Sudanese Civil War (1983-2005). Following *Garang's* death in 2005, *Salva Kiir* took a radically different approach to managing Southern divisions by incorporating the SSDF and other security services into a big tent under the heading of the formerly *Dinka-led SPLA*. In the Comprehensive Peace Agreement by January 9, 2005, SSDF finally was declared as "illegal", but unfortunately, violent conflicts between them and the SPLA persisted and are now pumping up the new conflict constellations. Partly, this seems to be due to ethnic double-binds: The integration of SSDF into the formerly Dinka-led SPLA and the corresponding amnesty policy resulted in an overturn of the Dinka domination as more than half the SPLA troops suddenly fell under Nuer influence. This swift was paralleled by a growing racialization of ethnic differences and finally resulted in a deeply divided army, despite efforts of key individuals. In January 2013, *Salva Kiir* tried to impose his authority by replacing all the deputy chiefs of general staff and he placed 35 senior officers on the reserve list. A month later, 118 brigadier generals were added to the reserve list, in effect retiring them. He also launched a process of consolidation of security forces personally loyal to him, including presiding a new presidential guard (armed and well organised Dinka youth).
South Sudan Democratic Movement/ Army (SSDM/SSDA)	The **South Sudan Democratic Movement / Army** (SSDM/SSDA) is a South Sudanese rebel group, which signed a peace deal with the Juba government on 27 February 2012. The SSDM was started by General *George Athor* after he failed to achieve his political ambitions in April 2010 elections. He was killed by the South Sudanese Army (SPLA) in December 2011.
SSDM Cobra-faction	The name '**Cobra faction**' emerged in mid-2013 to differentiate *Yau Yau's* second rebellion from the wider South Sudan Democratic Movement/Army (SSDM/A). According to the "Human Security Baseline Assessment for Sudan and South Sudan" (2014), *Yau Yau*, a *Murle* civilian from the *Ngarotti* clan and a leader in the *Bothonya* age set, first rebelled after the 2010 elections, when he failed to gain a seat in the state legislature. He later claimed his main motivation to rebel was the underdevelopment and marginalization of *Pibor* county, and the lack of local power-sharing with the *Bor* government. In his first rebellion, *Yau Yau* had comparatively few troops, with about 200 receiving presidential amnesty when he surrendered in 2011.
SSDM Army-Upper Nile	The *Shilluk* insurgencies were initially driven by disputes between the *Shilluk* community and the *government of Upper Nile* over land and county boundaries, and were galvanized by the 2010 disarmament campaign in which the SPLA 7th Division reportedly committed large-scale abuses. Initially, *Olony* and

his men spent a number of months waiting for integration into the SPLA in *Owachi* near 7th Division headquarters, but the process fell apart in March 2011 after one of *Olony's* men accused an SPLA soldier of raping his wife, and *Olony's* men demanded justice. In the ensuing battle, 14 were killed. *Olony* took his men across the border into *South Kordofan* and aligned with the **SSDM/A** under *Athor*. After *Athor's* death in December 2011 and *Awan's* peace deal in early 2012, *Olony* claimed overall leadership of the SSDM/A. The government repeatedly alleges that the *Shilluk* militia are aligned with, and receive support from, the SPLM-Democratic Change (SPLM-DC) political party, which SPLM-DC leader *Lam Akol* denies.

Areas of control. Throughout 2012 and into 2013, *Olony's* troops mainly operated in *Fashoda* and *Manyo* counties of Upper Nile, but were reported to move freely within *South Kordofan*, as well. In early 2012 they were co-located with Matthew *Puljang* and *Bapiny's SSLM/A troops* in *Kilo* 23 between *Hejlij* and *Kharasana*, where their troops reportedly received training and were provisioned by Khartoum. (For details see the "Human Security Baseline Assessment for Sudan and South Sudan", www.smallarmssurveysudan.org, updated November 6, 2013, Geneva, Switzerland)

Ethnic Structuring

As ethnic considerations play a certain role as well, some core data of the ethnic structuring of the South Sudanese society have to be mentioned: The major ethnic groups present in South Sudan are the Dinka at more than 1 million (approximately 15 percent combined), the Nuer (approximately ten percent), the Bari, and the Azande. The Shilluk constitute a historically influential state along the White Nile, and their language is fairly closely related to Dinka and Nuer. The traditional territories of the Shilluk and the Northeastern Dinka are adjacent. President Salva Kiir is a Dinka, while the most prominent opposition leader, Dr. Riek Machar, is a Nuer.

2.3 The start of the 2nd South Sudanese Civil War (12.2013 - ?)

December 2013   Already the beginning of this war is a hotly disputed issue. While President *Salva Kiir* has called it a coup attempt and announced that it had been put down the next day, most leading sources such as the International Crisis Group or Enough! agree on the following description:

December 06, 2013   On December 6, *Machar, Rebecca Nyandeng de Mabior*, presidential adviser and the widow of *Dr. John Garang* (SPLM's first chairman), *Pagan Amum* and many dismissed cabinet members held a press conference in Juba at which they denounced the party's "loss of vision" and accused President *Salva Kiir* of "dictatorial tendencies". In a bid to stem the crisis, the long-delayed meeting of the National Liberation Council (NLC) was held on December 14.

December 15, 2013   The 2nd Civil War in South Sudan began on the evening of 15 December 2013, at the meeting of the NLC meeting at *Nyakuron*, when Opposition leaders *Dr. Riek Machar*, *Pagan Amum* and *Rebecca Nyandeng* voted to boycott the Sunday December 15, 2013 meeting of the National Liberation Council (NLC). President *Salva Kiir* ordered SPLM Major *General Marial Ciennoung*, commander of the Presidential Guard (The Tiger Battalion) to leave the meeting venue and return to the barracks to disarm the troops. After disarming all ethnicities within the guard, *Marial* ordered that the *Dinka* members be re-armed. His deputy from the *Nuer* ethnicity began to question this order and a fight ensured when surrounding officers saw the commotion. The *Nuer* soldiers also rearmed themselves. Fighting erupted between the *Dinka* elements of the Presidential Guard and the *Nuer* elements. This lasted from Sunday night until Monday afternoon. Civilian casualties began when the Dinka elements of the SPLM began targeting *Nuer* civilians in the capital city of *Juba*. (cf. [www.southsudannation.com/it-wasnt-a-coup-salva-kiir-shot- himself-in-the-foot/](www.southsudannation.com/it-wasnt-a-coup-salva-kiir-shot-himself-in-the-foot/))

December 16, 2013   *Salva Kiir*, who called these events a coup attempt and blamed his former Vice president *Riek Machar* for instigating this "coup", announced already on December 15 to have coped with the coup, but fighting again erupted on 16 December and spread beyond the capital *Juba* to the region around *Jonglei*, which is prone since long to ethnic conflicts. (see [www.un.org/apps/news/ /story.asp?NewsID=46912&Cr=south+sudan& Crl=](www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=46912&Cr=south+sudan&Crl=))

December 19, 2013   Eye witnesses of Human Rights Watch cite SPLM *Dinka* troops assisted by guides in house to house searches to *Nuer* homes and killing systematically civilians in *Juba*. Similar door to door searches of members of the *Nuer* ethnicity have been reported from *Malakal* (Upper Nile).

Bor was seized by the South Sudan Liberation Army on December 19 and on the same day, a UN compound was stormed in *Akobo, Jonglei*, resulting in the deaths of two Indian UNMISS peacekeepers. UN Secretary General had also issued deep concern as Senior government Information Minister demanded armed access to UN Mission Camps where civilians were sheltering. Following this incident, President *Salva Kiir* accused the UN of sheltering armed opposition forces in their UN Mission, which the UN has staunchly denied. *Salva Kiir* also accused the UN of an attempted takeover of his leadership. (cf. www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-25826598/)

February 2014
February 10, 2014

At February 10, 2014, UN base in Juba surrounded by armed government troops and policemen demanded the UN surrender *Nuer* civilians sheltering there. SPLA spokesman *Philip Aguer* has not commented on the situation. At February 18, 2014, fighting between members of various ethnicities broke out within the UN Mission in the capital city *Malakal* (Upper Nile State).

Part 2   Fragmentation and Regionalisation

A careful analysis of this complex conflict configuration reveals two keywords, *political frag-mentation and regionalisation*, around which the dynamics of the current political landscape can be arranged.

On the one hand, both countries, CAR and Sudan, are fragmented by an endless number of different interest and rebel groups, each defending individual interests at stake and representing similar or different segments of society. The linkages between these different groups are controversial and partly very unclear, which renders it very difficult if not impossible to steer and/or settle such conflicts by governmental agreements or other top-down approaches. This the more so as both governments do not really control their state territories. For initiating political change, institutional arrangements based upon the rule of law are systematically ignored; the overthrow or destruction of governments in power makes rather the rule. Attempts to tackle democratic elections are in both countries challenged by violent minority groups, who openly or secretly reject all those results which are not appealing them. And finally, attempts to reintegrate former rebels into regular army structures are challenged by all the war crimes and crimes against the humanity, these groups have committed already. And in case of troubles, criminal pasts ease very much the grip to the weapons.

On the other hands and in addition to shifting tribal and state alliances within the competing groups, refugee flows from Sudan and South Sudan into neighbouring Chad and CAR as well as retroverse are important factors in the process of regionalisation. Further, ungoverned territories, as they exist especially in the rectangle between the northern parts of the CAR, the south-western parts of Chad and Sudan and the north-western parts of South Sudan, constitute a perfect refuge for uncontrolled transit, human trafficking, rebels and all kinds of ragtag groups. While much of CAR conflict remains internal *"Déby's influence on CAR central government as well as Chadian and Sudanese rebels' use of the north-eastern region as a maelstrom of political and criminal activity has generated a regional dynamic"* (Giroux, Lanz and Sguitamatti, 2009:9). This dynamic can well be exemplified on the basis of François Bozizé's implication in one of his coup attempts against Patassé: After his failing in 2001, Bozizé sought refuge in Chad, where he enjoyed the hospitality of Déby. In addition, he got a backing from France, Congo, Congo-Brazzaville and Gabon (Berg, 2008). In 2003, when François Bozizé amassed a group of fighters in order to finally overthrow Patassé, his rebel group consisted of impoverished young men and ex-combatants from Chad and CAR. According to Giroux, Lanz and Sguitamatti (2009:10) President Bozizé then accused Khartoum of supporting armed groups in the north-eastern region of his country, although Sudan has denied such claims[13]. Similar manoeuvres can be exemplified on the basis of the forming and shifting support of rebel groups. Particularly critical are of course the relations between Sudan and South Sudan, as the latter was until 2011 part of the former. JEM for instance, the

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[13] *"Khartoum's interest in supporting the northern CAR rebel movements"*, Giroux, Lanz and Sguitamatti (2009:10) argue, *"was due to the desire of Sudan to use the rebellion to blackmail Bozizé and persuade him to limit Chadian influence in CAR, thus depriving Sudan's enemy Déby of an ally in the region (Prunier, 2007)."*

Justice and Equality Movement, took shape as rebel movement within the Republic of Sudan. As old ally of the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A)[14], it is strongly involved in the Darfur conflict. In February 2003, the *Justice and Equality (JEM)* groups in Darfur took arms, accusing the Sudanese government of oppressing non-Arab Sudanese in favour of Sudanese Arabs, precipitating the War in Darfur. With the secession of South Sudan, it became however possible to use South Sudan as a host and save haven for further destabilizing the current politics of the Republic of Sudan. Because of this, the Republic of Sudan on its turn is now accused of supporting the SSDM Army-Upper Nile, another unofficial army fragment within the Republic of South Sudan.

> I share thus the conclusion of Giroux, Lanz and Sguitamatti (2009:10) that what Sudan, South Sudan, Chad and CAR have in common *"is the inability of ruling elites in the capital to project the Weberian monopoly on the legitimate use of violence in their hinterlands. As a result, those holding power in the centre are constantly threatened by rebellions that may materialise in peripheral areas. To counter this threat, the ruling elites are compelled to enter clientelistic relationships with insurgent groups, secret services and governments of the region become a key factor for conflict regionalisation. Such relationships entail arming and mobilising rebel groups across the border and unleashing them against the insurgents and the civilian population that apparently supports them."* It also includes the constant implication of neighbouring countries, such as DRC, Ethiopia, Gabon, Kenya, Libya or Uganda and the appealing to global forces such as China, France or the US, in order to secure patronage.

In line with this, a limited but significant number of critical key-factors that shape and constantly perpetuate this fateful government rectangle has already been enlisted by Giroux, Lanz and Sguitamatti in 2009:

1 Hinterlands in post-colonial states

First of all, there is the African border problem. Almost all African states suffer under borders which were drawn arbitrarily by the colonial powers, dividing areas that once had strong historic links and bringing them under the rule of separate, distant capitals, which never achieved to control their "hinterlands". Thus, in many large post-colonial African states, the hinterlands are historically, economically, politically, legally and culturally dissoci-

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[14] The Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (not to be confused with Sudan People's Liberation Army/Movement) (abbreviated as either **SLM** or **SLA**) is a Sudanese rebel group. It was founded as the Darfur Liberation Front.

ated from their capitals and in many cases oriented towards neighbouring areas across the border. Eastern Chad, north-eastern CAR and Darfur provide telling examples for this. This regions are almost a thousand kilometres far from their respective state capitals and during the rainy season overland travels are particularly difficult. *"Eastern Chad is the site of the historic Wadai Sultanate, which was an independent political entity for centuries (Behrends, 2007). Likewise Darfur was independent until 1916, when the British incorporated the Darfur Sultanate into Sudan. Furthermore, Darfur is several hundred kilometres far from Khartoum and geographically distinct from the Nile Valley and Northern Sudan (Prunier, 2007:1-4). CAR presents the most extreme example of hinterland isolation: the district of Vakaga in the northeast is almost a thousand kilometres far from Bangui, and during half of the year completely unreachable overland. Furthermore, people of the northeast do not speak Sanjo, CARs national language, and most of them are Muslims. In terms of culture, politics and trade, north-eastern CAR is oriented towards Abéché in eastern Chad and Nyala in South Darfur as opposed to Bangui or any other part of CAR (ICG 2007:25). Isolated hinterlands coupled with state weakness have fostered the regionalisation of armed conflict in north-central Africa insofar as they offer strategic rear bases for rebels from neighbouring countries. (...) Furthermore, the power vacuum in their peripheries requires the ruling elites of Sudan, (South Sudan/MW), Chad and CAR to build clientelistic networks on one or the other side of the border in order to gain a military advantage and to tap into the lucrative trans-border trade. This has involved arms deliveries to transnational tribal groups, which contribute to escalating and regionalising armed conflicts"* (Giroux, Lanz and Sguitamatti, 2009:10).

2   Historic pattern of regionalised conflict and integration

Another important layer mentions Andrea Behrends (2007), namely the border region between Sudan and Chad, as this region was historically an intermediate zone with the Sultanate of *Wadai* (Eastern Chad) on the one side and the Sultanate of *Darfur* (Sudan) on the other. The frontier region - where armed conflict is taking place today - represented an area for strategic competition between the two regional powers (2007:101). The people living between *Wadai* and *Darfur* were forcibly integrated into one or the other sultanate. Local chiefdoms learned to instrumentalise big-power rivalry, and when one of the regional powers weakened, they should shift their allegiance (Behrends 2007:102). Today, Darfur and Eastern Chad are peripheral areas, whose inhabitants are systematically neglected by their capital-cities and used to fight proxy wars, most violently in the 1980s and again since 2003 (cf. Giroux, Lanz and Sguitamatti, 2009:11).

3   Trans-border ethnic communities

The regionalisation of conflict has also been fostered by the presence of ethnic communities inhabiting the border areas whose loyalties primarily lie with their kin, rather than with the central elite. In this regard, the role of the Zaghawa tribe, also called Beri, is particularly significant, as for the Zaghawa, like other nomadic Arabic tribes, the border has never existed. Tubiana stresses, that a person can be born in one of these countries and live in another, and feel finally belonging to the two (Tubiana, 2008: 22). Their role has been enhanced since *Idriss Déby* - he is a *Bideyat Zaghawa* - took power in Chad in 1990. Their access to power at the Chadian side has fostered an increasing awareness among the *Zaghawa* tribe in Darfur, where they are living as disenfranchised community within the Sudanese state. It is thus not surprising that *Zaghawa* leaders, backed from support across the borders, have played a key role in the Darfur rebellion against the central Sudanese government (Giroux, Lanz and Sguitamatti, 2009:11).

Ethnic solidarity across the borders is not automatic. However, the fact that the ruling elite in *N'Djamena* consisted of a group whose kin in neighbouring Sudan were being persecuted made it difficult for the Chadian government to remain uninvolved. This constellation drew the Chadian government inevitably into the war in *Darfur*, which, in its turn, spills now over to South Sudan and the Central African Republic.

4   Cross-border migration and trade

The Governance Rectangle between Sudan, South Sudan, Chad and CAR did historically never function as a border. Indeed, specialists of the region stress the longstanding migration and transborder trades between eastern Chad, north-eastern CAR and Darfur, which today result in spreading armed conflicts in the region (cf. Behrends 2007, Berg 2008, Giroux, Lanz and Sguitamatti 2009, Prunier 2007, 2008 and many others). Disenfranchised young men from Arab tribes in Chad were already recruited into the ranks of the notorious *Janjaweed*, and not surprisingly, similar Arab militia groups eventually formed in eastern Chad referred to young men with similar backgrounds (Giroux, Lanz and Sguitamatti, 2009:11).

CAR has a 1200 kilometre frontier with Sudan, but according to the International Crisis Group the CAR government only maintains two border posts (International Crisis Group, 2007). Consequently, north-eastern CAR acts as an area of transit and trade for nomadic peoples and rebel groups from all neighbouring countries. The border between Darfur and eastern Chad is similar porous. Thus, the *Darfur* rebels are procuring most of their weaponry from eastern Chad.

5   Combatants with 'fluid loyalties'

Since the commencement of the Darfur conflict in 2003, a large number of armed groups have emerged in north-central Africa (Prunier, 2008). Some of them have a political agenda, but many seem to be motivated by economic opportunities. There is a pool of armed men, whose livelihood and social identity depend entirely on their status as combatants. Returning to their home communities and reintegration into civil life is for them not really a perspective as long as alternative economic incentives are scarce and the (brutal) use of violence continues entailing local stigmatisation. For self-proclaimed political leaders and weak governments, these combatants have made it easy and cheap to instigate rebellions or to fight counterinsurgencies in neighbouring countries. If governments had have to send troops, it would have been much more costly and less interesting. With satellite rebel clusters proxy warfare gained thus a lot of attractiveness as warfare under remote control became a common feature of central African politics. Also President *Bozizé* and *Michel Djodotia* took power in CAR thanks to such actors, and they subsequently instigated the rebellion in north-eastern CAR. Many of these combatants are fighting as part of Khartoum-sponsored rebel groups in eastern Chad; the *Janjaweed* and the *Darfur* rebels may also have recruited from them.

The primary challenge is thus to recognise that north-central Africa constitutes a complex of interconnected conflict systems and that there is consequently a need - as Giroux, Lanz and Sguitamatti (2009:15) argue - to devise *"sets of policies that address multiple areas and sources of conflict within a given region in an integrated way"*. An important reason for the ineffectiveness of the current policies is thus the disregard of the regional dimension of the conflicts in Darfur, eastern Chad and north-eastern CAR, which again had a catalysing impact on the new breakout of violence. For humanitarian actors, it is thus crucial to avoid nationalised sub-categories such as the current distinction between refugees and internally displaced persons, as the regionalised conflicts are transcending state boundaries and are producing quite similar vulnerabilities across the entire conflict system. For international mediators, it is further crucial to address historically grown structural conflicts such as the marginalisation of hinterlands and to achieve brokering agreements between rebel groups and the respective governments that determine the sharing of wealth and power between the political centres and the peripheries. And finally, internationally coordinated programmes to promote processes of state- and nation-building and the stand for the rule of law throughout the entire governance rectangle are imperatives of the day.

Part 3

Options for the promotion of Peace, Security, Stability, and Development

For most of these regional key-factors, the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region is well prepared as it has an integral regional focus. However, the new ICGLR strategic plan (2014-2018) focuses principally on the conflict profile in DRC and classifies rising rebellions in CAR as well as persistent tensions in Sudan and South Sudan as risk factors which eventually may endanger the conflict settlement in DRC. Hence, as most of ICGLRs current programmes are embedded in the Regional Framework Agreement, signed on 24 February 2013 in Addis Ababa, especially the strategic plan's success indicators have to be revised in order to tackle the particular conflict constellation in the fateful governance rectangle. As to he specific turmoils in the Central African Republic and the Republic of South Sudan, the following and final section discusses thus some strategic pull-out options for the (re-) establishment of security, stability and development.

1 Regional challenges for the ICGLR

Though all programme units have in principal a say for the stabilisation of the fateful governance rectangle, it is important to prioritise the different programme entities and to question their form, given the urgency of a thoughtful intervention. Considering the perpetual regional instability, challenging questions come to the fore, as the ICGLR is essentially a regional government organisation which is likely to collaborate with state actors, such as Ministries or national coordinators[15]. ICGLRs potentially constructive impact on the conflict settlement depends thus <u>first</u> on the political and legal legitimacy of these governmental bodies. Considering this aspect, the conflict constellation differs quite remarkably from the DRC/Rwanda/Burundi-Case, though all these governments trouble with the control of their respective hinterlands as well: But the governments of the DRC, of Rwanda and Burundi dispose all of a democratically justified and legally binding political legitimacy embedded in a constitution reigned by the rule of law, which provides some reliable grounds for an ICGLR intervention. With regards to the Central African Republic however, where with the exception of the *Patassé*-Regime almost all governments came to power by the racketeering, supportive measures of the ICGLR are endangered by the lack of political legitimacy of its governmental structures[16]. And in the young nation state of South Sudan are the democratic structures and the rule of law still that weak and fragile that no one can really build on. Already for reasons of political legitimacy and wisdom, it is thus advisable to coordinate future ICGLR steps with other important international bodies such as the UN, the African Union, the International Red Cross or IGAD, who all defend in common with the ICGLR the general val-

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[15] The ICGLR is composed of 12 Member States, i.e. Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, Republic of Congo (Congo-Brazzaville), Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, South Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia, who signed in 2006 a common pact on political stability, security, development and regional integration.

[16] In its Africa Report 137 from 2007, International Crisis Group calls the CAR a "phantom state".

ues of the international humanitarian law and the corresponding Human Rights standards. However, as distinguished from all the other international bodies disposes the ICGLR of a clear political mandate by representing the common will of its 12 Member States to tackle the regional problems relating to peace, security, stability and development (Pact of Nairobi). This political mandate obliges the ICGLR to play a leading role in the process of conflict resolution in the fateful governance rectangle.

A second challenge refers to the social level of intervention, as the conflict profile of the fateful governance rectangle is largely marked by non-state actors. It might be worth questioning what constructive contribution the governmental side could provide for a transborder and regional conflict pattern, largely marked by non-state actors and absent or weak governments. All these non-state actors try either to appropriate and instrumentalise the government apparatus by armed coups and the racketeering (CAR) or are, like in the case of Sudan and South Sudan, competing with the post-colonial nation state for the access to power, to (regional) political legitimacy and to economic benefits (such as the natural resources). State-centred approaches to settle such conflicts, as they have been developed in continuation to the 2nd world war and specified within the OSCE-structure, are thus difficult to pursue. Within such a regional instability marked by perpetual motion, many important interveners advise rather focussing on the sub-state level and taking linkages between communities across state boundaries into account, especially there, where geographic proximity and intense interdependencies are significant. In such contexts, new institutions with new (para-)legal frameworks might emerge, which compete with official structures and partly might achieve to structure alternatively a given geographical space[17], as it is for instance the case with the "road-cutters" in the Central African Republic. A further characteristic is their orientation towards commercial or religious centres in the hinterlands, rather than their state capitals. Hence, a reliable peace concept has to come to terms with decisions relying on trust, consensus, shared responsibility and respected regulations grounded in the rule of law and not on megalomania fantasies of divide and conquest.

However, inclusivity is the word of the day, and an inclusive approach can certainly not simply bypass the governmental level! At the top-level, binding peace agreements are key. But they risk remaining dead paper, if they do not refer to reached consensus at other levels of society and do not comply with essential needs of the conflicting parties at sub-state level. It is thus worth to consult again the Addis Framework Agreement, to pick and eventually revise those paragraphs, which comply with the new conflict constellation as well. In addition, a common and binding road map with all stakeholders should be developed in order to come to terms with an agreement based on trust, consensus, shared responsibility and in the rule of law.

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[17] for more general thoughts on this issue see Weilenmann and Zips (2011): The Governance of Legal Pluralism. Empirical Studies on Africa and beyond, New York, Berlin and Vienna: LIT editions

But such challenges reveal a particular weakness of the ICGLR approach, which has to be tackled, that is the communication between the ICGLR secretariat and its national coordinators and the national coordinators' variable capacity to build adequate social forums, who are able to attract sufficient interest from the non-state sector (such as the gender forum, the youth forum, the civil society forum and so on). Such challenges have to be mastered, so that the ICGLR can play its regional trump cards and demonstrate how it can tackle the endless harm within the fateful governance rectangle.

2 Recommendations of two think tanks: International Crisis Group and **!enough**

In its recently released report on the conflicts in South Sudan (2014/217), the International Crisis Group challenges the 2005 IGAD-brokered Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), that ended Sudan's second civil war (1983-2005). It advocates for a radical restructuring of the South Sudanese state composition: *"Propping up the government in Juba and polishing its legitimacy with a dose of political dialogue and a dash of power sharing will not end the conflict"* (cf. 2014/217:ii). It calls the CPA much too narrow minded and pleads for a reconsideration of the fundamentals of the now failed peace agreement. To this end, the Crisis Group recommends the following:

"To the UN Security Council

- Amend the mandate of the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) to ensure it is consistent across the country and emphasis protection of civilians, human rights reporting, support for the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) mediation process and logistical help for the African Union (AU) Commission of Inquiry.

- Signal clearly that leaders will be held responsible for the actions of troops they command, and any interference with UNMISS and humanitarian operations may give rise to targeted sanctions.

- Ensure that any support provided to an IGAD or other regional force is consistent with and does not undermine UNMISS' ability to carry out its mandated tasks, particularly its protection of civilians responsibilities.

To UNMISS

- Communicate more effectively to all parties the parameters of its refocused mandate, including its Chapter VII protection of civilians responsibility, and respond consistently to increasing restrictions and violations of its status of forces agreement with the government of South Sudan that undermine its ability to carry out the tasks assigned by the Security Council.

To armed actors

- Enable impartial humanitarian access to civilians in need and do not link this access to the cessation of hostilities or any other agreement (enable the provision of unconditioned help). Comply with international humanitarian law, specifically:

  ➢ halt the targeting of civilians, including by stopping combat operations in areas where civilians cannot be distinguished from combatants and avoiding combat in areas around UN bases where those seeking protection are sheltered, and

  ➢ end the looting and destruction of humanitarian facilities" (2014/217: iii)

With this package of advises, ICG hopes addressing adequately the deteriorating political, security and humanitarian situation. In addition, International Crisis Group developed a series of advises for promoting an inclusive political dialogue, ensuring accountability for war crimes and atrocities and for preventing a further regionalisation of the conflict. To this end, it addresses along with the South Sudanese actors also international partners such as IGAD, AU, and any other international partner as follows:

"To the South Sudanese actors, IGAD, AU, and other international partners

- Establish three separate negotiation tracks - focused on the SPLM, (other) armed groups and communal conflict - that are appropriately sequenced and contribute to the broader process of national political dialogue.

- Discuss and plan interim political and military arrangements that go beyond simple power sharing between the elites driving the conflict to bring in an inclusive group of South Sudanese who reflect the country's political and ethnic diversity, as well as regional figures.

- Include in the peace process South Sudanese civil society representatives, such as religious leaders, community-based organisations, youth leaders, women's associations and others.

- Recognise that engagement with all armed groups and militarised communities is critical to sustainable conflict resolution and that failure to do so will undermine the mediation and may make spoilers of those who could otherwise be constructively engaged in national processes.

- Ensure that truth, justice, and reconciliation are part of a process to address mass atrocities and prevent further conflict.

- Provide the AU Commission of Inquiry into Human Rights Abuses adequate staff, time and resources to consult widely when formulating its recommendations, including with the parties in conflict, civil society, religious organisations and communities.

- Consider a hybrid tribunal with South Sudanese and international judges, similar to the Special Court in Sierra Leone, as a vehicle through which to obtain concrete and visible justice for the people of South Sudan.

  ➢ Deploy an IGAD or other regional force only if:

  ➢ it has a clear mandate that supports a political resolution of the conflict;

  ➢ there are adequate troops and financial resources available for speedy deployment; and

  ➢ adequate precautions are put in place to ensure it works towards a shared political vision and not troop contributors' individual interests.

- Increase political coordination between IGAD mediation process and the African Union High-Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP) for Sudan and South Sudan, as tensions continue to increase between the two states.

- Establish a Contact Group that includes IGAD, the AU, UN, Troika (US, UK and Norway), European Union (EU), China and South Africa to facilitate discussions on the way forward and coordination between international actors.

- Avoid competing, parallel and piecemeal efforts by ensuring that no donor or externally driven peace and reconciliation projects, or politically sensitive development work, is undertaken in isolation from the national processes; and engage to improve any national processes that are not legitimate rather than advance alternatives" (ICG, 2014/217).

This set of recommendations, characterised by many concerns on how to implicate representatives from the sub-state and civil society level is already very helpful, as it has an integrative focus. However, by focussing almost exclusively on the both Sudans, all these recommendations, how concrete and convincingly they might be, are still lacking qualified options to come to terms with the typical regional markers of the fateful governance rectangle. Already in the past, there have been various initiatives to make peace through mediation and negotiations between rebel groups and their respective governments: The African Union mediated between the Darfur rebels and the Sudanese government in Abuja, Nigeria from 2004-2006; along with the UN, the AU continued to organise peace negotiations with the aim of ending the Darfur conflict until late 2011; also Libya tried to broker deals between various Chadian rebel groups and President Déby, while CAR organised its inclusive political dialogue in order to end the "Central African Bush War" in 2009. None of these processes has borne fruit and some have arguably made matters worse by contributing to the fragmentation of the rebel groups. North-central Africa is since long also a host to different peacekeeping missions such as now the UNMISS in South Sudan, the UNISFA - a UN interim Security Force - in Abyei (South Sudan), the UNAMID in Sudan (Darfur), MINUSCA and the French troops Sangaris in Central African Republic and finally IGAD is also pushing for a

South Sudan Protection Force[18] etc. Lacking however is an overarching regional concept addressing common issues throughout the concerned nation states, while one wonders, whether all these forces will generate the requested impacts. State-building, which is by many international stakeholders today so prominently pushed forward, is by the way not a narrow-minded nationalised concept but part of an encompassing legal strategy to tackle regional conflicts[19]. Therefore, it is time to complement such thoughtful recommendations with a regional approach dealing with the conflicting web of the entire governance rectangle.

In this respect, the US-American NGO **!enough,** close to Washington DC, comes up with some interesting proposals, imbedded in its recently released report on the disturbing situation in the Central African Republic (Agger, May 2014). Below, these proposals are summarized, as they offer for the ICGLR some interesting door openers to step in with its long lasting experiences on how to manage regional conflicts on natural resources. The regional proposals are written in italic type.

"To the United Nations

- The UN should deploy experienced mediators to work with US Special Representative Symington and a diverse group of CAR leaders to spur a bottom-up peace process for CAR. The decentralized nature of the conflict in CAR and the lack of a central command of the armed groups require a bottom-up peace approach that tackles each individual armed group through local negotiations. Such a bottom-up process should include local dialogue across the country and a national peace conference. (...) Dialogues should prominently feature the voices of civil society actors, including women, traditional leaders, religious figures, youth, and armed groups. Moreover, the United Nations should work with CAR leaders to ensure that recommendations from the bottom-up peace process and its participants are made an integral part of CARs transitional political process.

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[18] According to Uganda's Newspaper "NEW VISION" (30.04.2014) approved IGAD heads of state the deployment of the force at the 25th Extraordinary African Heads of State summit on South Sudan held in March. "IGAD special envoys said they had visited several member states calling for a faster process to deploy the protection force and fast-track the mediation process. The Special Envoys have conducted a series of shuttle missions to regional capitals and held consultations with leaders of IGAD countries as well as the African Union, the United Nations and IGAD Partners to mobilize support for the mediation process and the unhindered operations of the IGAD Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (MVM) as well as to expedite the deployment of the regional Protection Force (PF).(...)"

[19] Nation states are not like rocky blocks standing around in the wild grassland.

To the United nations, European Union, and/or bilateral donors

- The UN, EU and/or bilateral donors should fund international advisors to support the National Transitional Council and the interim government in CAR. Immediate support is needed to strengthen the capacity of the transitional government to deliver basic state services such as functional hospitals, schools, police, judges, tax collection, and general state administration.(...)

To the United Nations, the World Bank, the European Union and other donors

- The UN, the WB, other international donors such as the EU should work closely with the leaders of the CAR transition to rebuild the justice system and prosecute those most responsible for the violence. *Such prosecutions and investigations should include the illicit wildlife and natural resource trade that has helped fund the Séléka and Anti-Balaka*.

To the International Criminal Court

- The ICC should prioritize investigations and prosecute those most responsible for the violence in CAR, including those involved in sexual violence and economic criminal activity.

To the UN Panel of Experts and the UN-appointed Commission of Inquiry

- The UN Panel of Experts on CAR and the UN appointed Commission of Inquiry on CAR should investigate and document economic criminal activity and coordinate their efforts. The panel of Experts investigates illicit trade, while the Commission of Inquiry investigates violations of human rights and international humanitarian law. The Panel of Experts should recommend targeted sanctions for those responsible for the illicit trade of natural resources. The Commission of Inquiry should investigate international human rights and humanitarian crimes that are associated with looting and pillage, including sexual violence.

To the African Union Peace and Security Council

- *The AU peace and Security Council should appoint a special envoy to address transnational security and economic matters that involve CAR, Sudan, and Chad. The marginalized and underdeveloped border region between Chad, CAR, and Sudan has been source of instability in Central Africa for decades. Shifting regional alliances, rebel groups, smuggling syndicates, and mercenary networks have the ability to threaten regional stability. The AU special envoy should work with the US special representative and heads of state to identify a common policy approach to the tri-border region*

and develop measures to prevent the governments of CAR, Sudan and Chad from meddling in the sovereign affairs of their neighbours.

To the African Union and the United Nations

- The AU and the UN should mediate negotiations between the governments of Chad and CAR on a bilateral agreement for the exploration of the cross-border oilfields between the two states. Chad is extracting oil from cross-border oilfields along the border with CAR, which may depleting the oil revenues accessible to CAR in the future. Typically, such disputes are handled in bilateral talks, but given CARs weakness, a mediated dialogue is necessary. An agreement that is developed transparently and with international oversight could ensure that the governments and people of both Chad and CAR benefit from the oil wealth.

To the United States and China

- *The United States and China should urge the Kimberley Process to send review missions to the United Arab Emirates, Belgium, and India for investigation into the smuggling of conflict diamonds from CAR. CAR has been suspended from the Kimberley Process since may 2013 because of the military coup and the danger of conflict diamonds, which are likely to enter the international diamond trade through the neighbouring countries of Cameroon, the DRC, and Sudan. From here, the diamonds go to the main international trading and manufacturing centres for diamonds: Dubai, Antwerp, and India. Review missions and investigations are needed to tighten controls in the trading centres, halt this illegal trade, and identify individuals and companies against whom the United States and the United Nations could issue targeted sanctions.*

To the United States Government

- The US government should, if security conditions allow, reopen the embassy in Bangui, as it is important for supporting the US Special Representative Symington in his peacemaking efforts, and allows a monitoring of the drivers of violence as well as communicate early warnings.(...)" (Agger 2014: 2-4).

Especially with regards to the regional recommendations, the ICGLR should reconsider its stand-by position, develop a coherent methodical approach in order to integrate the above outlined viewpoints and to transplant its professional regional experiences with the mastering of the "Great Lakes Conflict" to the Governance Rectangle in North-Central Africa. For this, a close coordination with IGAD, the UN bodies and the African Union is however key. But possible interferences especially with IGAD, who is now much active in the Sudans, have

to be checked as also IGAD disposes of partly quite similar instruments, techniques and approaches. Good examples for this are the Joint Verification Mechanism (JVM) and the Expanded Joint Verification Mechanism (EJVM), both very useful instruments for verifying claims and counterclaims by neighbouring states in conflict. It would thus be awkward to drop in as late comers with the same "medicine", instead of improving the ICGLR profiling. The following chapter, which completes this study, outlines some proposals and collects some first, loose suggestions.

3   Basic points for a regional ICGLR intervention

So far, no coherent conflict settlement strategy for the entire governance rectangle has been developed, though it can be made very clear that exactly this rectangle leads to a perpetual motion of regional instability. The almost exclusive focus on national conflict profiles misleads the international interveners and results in an amassment of an entire variety of different peacemaking missions. But - as is so often the case - too many cooks spoil the broth. At the same time, important regional factors remain largely unaddressed. At a regional level however, immediate solutions for the following problems have to found:

- The existence of ungoverned territories. Such territories constitute a perfect refuge for transit, human trafficking, rebels and ragtag groups. Especially North-eastern CAR acts as an area of transit and trade for nomadic peoples and rebel groups from all neighbouring countries.

- porous borders and hinterlands. Historically, economically, politically, legally and culturally dissociated from their capitals, such hinterlands remain oriented towards neighbouring areas across the border. Local chiefdoms start mushrooming again and they learned since long to instrumentalise big-power rivalry. The frontier region between Chad and Sudan represents such an area for strategic competition between two regional powers.

- Interference of high ranking political leaders/stakeholders from neighbouring countries. Such interference on ungoverned territories leads to a maelstrom of political and criminal activity and to a regionally uncontrollable dynamic in the entire governance rectangle. And at the very end, no one will be a profiteer.

- Inhabitants, who are used to fight proxy wars. Especially in the peripheral areas, there is a pool of armed men, whose livelihood and social identity depend entirely on their status as combatants. For self-proclaimed political leaders and weak governments, these combatants have made it easy and cheap to instigate rebellions or to fight counterinsurgencies in neighbouring countries.

- Ethnic communities inhabiting the border areas whose loyalties primarily lie with their kin, rather than with the central elite are fostering further the regionalisation of conflict.

- Enormous refugee flows within the fateful governance rectangle improve the mobility of goods, customs, ideologies and traditions and are another important boost for the regionalisation of conflict.

- Arms trade. There is an important illicit arm trade across the borders. The *Darfur* rebels for example are procuring most of their weaponry from eastern Chad.

- Access to and trade with natural resources (conflict diamonds, cross-border oilfields) as well as illicite wildlife hunting. Access to and trade with wildlife and natural resources are key issues for the funding of rebel movements (Séléka and Anti-Balaka); also, they impact on the bi- and multilateral relations between the involved nation states of the governance rectangle.

- international profiteers (trading centres), who make an enormous benefit with the illicit access to natural resources and wildlife are often controlled by mafia networks in the West.

The ICGLR secretariat should make it internationally clear that in contrast to most other interveners it disposes already of an entire basket of well developed programmes and strategies to address such issues:

- In imitation of the Addis Framework Agreement, the ICGLR should launch a negotiation process with the Heads of State of the governance rectangle in order to address the above enlisted issues at a regional stage. In addition, such an intense negotiation process could improve the fragile personal relationships between the Heads of State and ease the required communication in case of crisis. In any case, it is imperative to involve Chad into the process (though Chad is so far not part of the ICGLR process[20]), as many critical linkages pass by Idriss Déby.

- The required extension of State authority through the deployment of a regional intervention force, which coordinates the various interventions at local level at a transnational scale, should be tabled. In any case, such an intervention should integrate the "do-no-harm" concept. As such an extension of State authority encompasses also the deployment of police, the establishment of a coherent territorial administration and the set-up of reliable judicial and prison institution, one should never forget the

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[20] perhaps, it reveals one day that this has to be changed, given the enormous impact of Chad

legitimacy problem of such an intervention: The quality of state services is often measured by its capacity to render services of social security and medical help, such as accessible hospitals, social welfare and the like.

- The threat posed by armed groups can be addressed through a comprehensive strategy using military means, incl. regional economic and security co-operation, border surveillances, and demobilisation packages. In addition, to tackle the problem of armed groups requires also the cutting off of the support of neighbouring countries while addressing legitimate community grievances.

- The Lusaka Centre could be mandated with a training module for local mediators, who master the required national idioms. Such mediators are highly requested, as, like the American NGO **!enough** outlines, *"the decentralized nature of the conflict (...) and the lack of a central command of the armed groups require a bottom-up peace approach that tackles each individual armed group through local negotiations."*

- The management of natural resources is not only key for stopping the war but also for matters of restitution! Further, a transparent, independently monitored natural resource sector is also essential for security matters and for the creation of a convenient tax-collection system.

- On the level of ICGLRs programme implementation strategy finally, the pact on peace and security containing amongst other the following protocols could be referenced as guiding star:

  - The protocol on non-aggression and mutual defence in the Great Lakes Region
  - The protocol on judicial cooperation
  - The Protocol on the specific reconstruction and development zone, especially subsection a of article 10: Transborder development basins to promote local regional integration of the border population (protocol on trans-border cooperation)
  - The protocol on the negative forces and on conflict settlement
  - The protocol on the fight against transnational criminality and terrorism
  - The protocol on the reduction of the small and light weapons
  - The protocol on the protection and assistance to internally displaces persons
  - The protocol on Democracy and Good Governance
  - The protocol against the illegal exploitation of natural resources
  - The protocol for the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity and all forms of discrimination
  - The protocol on the fight against sexual and gender based violence

All these legally binding texts are specified in distinct programme clusters of ICGLRs strategy plan (2014-2018). However, some paper work remains, as the planned activities and indicators refer rather to the specific conflict constellation in DRC, and should, with regards to the regional problem configuration in the governance rectangle, thoughtfully be reworked.

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